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One View of the Cathedral' is now so much a part of the legal canon that
it is widely known simply by the joined names of its two authors, "Calabresi
and Melamed." In turn, "Calabresi and Melamed" has become a shorthand
name for the article's most famous legacy: the distinction between "property
rules" and "liability rules" as means of protecting entitlements.
Although The Cathedral has been widely cited over its venerable history,2
academic interest in its basic analytic categories has come and gone in waves."
As this classic piece now approaches its twenty-fifth anniversary, however, a
number of new articles have reignited the scholarly discussion of "property
rules" and "liability rules" as analytic categories.4 In several of these scholarly
ventures, beginning with The Cathedral itself, a particular explanatory example
looms in the foreground: It is an instance of environmental pollution, grounded
on a classic nuisance case, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,5 in which a
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1. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed. Property Rules, Liabilty Rules, ard Inahenabilty: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972)
2. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab. Property Rules and Liability Rules- The Cathedral in
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 440 n.4 (1995) (describing citations in legal database)
3. An early exploration was Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatves to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973), which described how The Cathedral's
categories could be used in neighborhood land use disputes. Another one-man wave came a few years later
with A. Mitchell Polinsky's series of three related articles: A. Mitchell Polinsky. Controlling Externalities
and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches. 8 J LEGAL STUD
1 (1979) [hereinafter Polinsky, Controlling Externalities); A. Mitchell Polinsky. On the Choice Beneen
Property Rules and Liability Rules. 18 ECON. INQUIRY 233 (1980) [hereinafter Polinsky. Choicel; and A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage
Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980) [hereinafter Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes] In the mid-
1980s, a third wave picked up the somewhat less-discussed "inalienability rules" that Calabresi and
Melamed also had raised: Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability 100 HARv L REV. 1849 (1987).
and Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights. 85 CoLtt L REv 931
(1985). Other general commentaries include Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus. Retunktng the Theory of
Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335 (1986); and Madeline Mors. The Structure of Entitlements. 78 CoRNELL
L. REv. 822 (1993).
4. See Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin. Legal Entitlements as Auctiots: Property Rules, Liabiliry Rules, and
Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); lan Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonc Bargaining: Dividng a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J 1027 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell.
Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis. 109 HARv L REV 713 (1996); Kner &
Schwab, supra note 2; Morris, supra note 3.
5. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
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cement factory polluted the air so as to damage a number of nearby residential
properties.6
This Essay explores the choice of Boomer-like examples in Calabresi and
Melamed's The Cathedral. More precisely, it focuses on an odd disjunct
between foreground examples like Boomer and the background intuitions that
actually seem to motivate the distinction between property rules and liability
rules. In spite of Boomer's quite visible appearance in The Cathedral, a rather
different example lurks in the shadows-something I will call a "shadow
example"-that actually drives the analysis. Part I of this Essay will argue that
the driving example in The Cathedral is not environmental nuisance at all, but
rather the law of accidents, an example that barely makes an appearance in the
article itself.
Interestingly enough, this same rhetorical pattern quite strikingly recurs in
two of the most recent intellectual progeny of Calabresi and Melamed's
famous article: Ian Ayres and Eric Talley's Solomonic Bargaining,7 and Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell's Property Rules Versus Liability Rules.'
Although each substantially revised the original analysis of Calabresi and
Melamed, each nevertheless continues the pattern of shadow example: Each
work showcases property examples, notably the ever-handy Boomer, while
relegating to the shadows the quite different paradigm that actually dominates
the analysis. Parts II and III of this Essay respectively will argue, in the case
of Ayres and Talley, that the shadow example is contract law; and in the case
of Kaplow and Shavell, that the shadow example returns to the law of
accidents.
The shadow example is an intriguing rhetorical turn-intriguing in that it
appears in The Cathedral, and even more intriguing in that it reemerges in
these two important recent contributions to the scholarship of property rules
and liability rules. To some degree the rhetorical pattern emerges from the very
ambitiousness of the subject that all these writers address. Despite the
becoming modesty of their title ("one view"), Calabresi and Melamed put forth
a synoptic view of common law entitlements arguably not seen since Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld's turn-of-the-century general categorization of legal rights.9
6. Boomer appeared to illustrate nicely the distinction between property rules and liability rules: The
majority of the court recognized the factory's pollution as a nuisance but awarded only a damage remcdy,
i.e., a "liability rule" award, while the dissent argued strongly that traditional nuisance law called for an
injunction, effectively taking the "property rule" approach. Cf. Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and
Markets in the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 303-06, 337-49 (1990)
(arguing that New York courts had invented Boomer-like damage remedies as early as turn of century); see
also Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at 442 (describing environmental pollution as "the stock example" in
property rule/liability rule literature).
7. Ayres & Talley, supra note 4.
8. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4.
9. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28 (1913) (describing pairs of reciprocal and opposite 'Jural relations"). For
an interesting reassessment of Hohfeld's categories, see Morris, supra note 3, at 827-31, 833-38, which
describes categories and criticizes their inadequacies with respect to transfers of entitlements, including
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In turn, Ayres and Talley, as well as Kaplow and Shavell, are ambitious and
able scholars in their own right, and they are interested in reconceptualizing
these same large legal problems. It is not just any doctrine that all of these
authors attack; it is the Cathedral, the structure of entitlements throughout the
entire common law. If any of these authors' respective comprehensive analyses
of property rules and liability rules are correct, then presumably the choice of
specific examples should not matter: Property rules and liability rules should
cut through them all.
But the position of this Essay is that the choice of examples does matter
after all, and indeed it matters most in the very enterprise that Calabresi and
Melamed so imaginatively opened up: delineating the underlying structure of
common law entitlements. In the Conclusion of this Essay, I will argue that by
inattentiveness to the examples they used, these authors not only claimed too
much but also blurred what may be the distinctive characteristics of the various
parts of our common law regimes. I will suggest that a closer attention to
examples could lead to a deeper understanding of the common law-one in
which the conventional categories of tort, contract, and property reveal quite
different dominating concerns.
I. CALABRESI AND MELAMED'S LIABILITY RULE "PROTECTIONS":
THE SHADOW OF ACCIDENTS
In their analysis of property rules and liability rules, Calabresi and
Melamed made at least two widely cited analytical contributions. The first was
to illustrate a pattern of entitlement enforcement that might be dubbed
"bilateral symmetry." That is, in a legal conflict, no matter which party wins,
the prevailing party's entitlement may be vindicated in one of two ways, either
through a "property rule" or through a "liability rule."'" Calabresi and
Melamed's chief example of these remedies and their symmetric relation came
from nuisance law, notably a simplified variation on the Booner case, in
which they cast a single residence owner in confrontation with the polluting
factory." On their account, the example generates four "rules," two favoring
the residence owner and two favoring the factory. If the homeowner has the
entitlement to be free of pollution, [Property] Rule 1 permits her to enjoin the
factory's pollution; but if her right is protected only by [Liability] Rule 2, she
has to endure pollution so long as the factory pays damages. On the other
hand, if the factory owner has the entitlement to pollute, protection through
liability rules.
10. For a four-box chart mapping this symmetric relation. see Kner & Schwab. supra note 2. at 444.
For a discussion of other possible remedies. see Saul Levmore. Unifying Remedies: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2153-60 (1997).
11. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1116 n.55; id. at 1116 n.54 (citing two other nuisance
cases).
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[Property] Rule 3 would allow him to do so freely. Finally, by the famous and
hitherto unexplored [Liability] Rule 4, Calabresi and Melamed opined that the
factory may be entitled to pollute, but the entitlement may be protected only
by a liability rule-so that the pollution entitlement can be bought by the
resident at some measure of just compensation. Calabresi and Melamed's novel
discussion of Rule 4 completed their bilaterally symmetric analysis of two
Property Rules and two Liability Rules; indeed, it seemed even more
significant when an Arizona judge arrived at a close- approximation of Rule 4,
just as The Cathedral was appearing.12
The Cathedral's second and more normative contribution has been a
constant refrain in subsequent legal literature. 3 This is Calabresi and
Melamed's claim about the appropriate deployment of the different rules.
Liability rules, they argued, are best applied in situations with high transaction
costs, where the parties cannot easily find or bargain with one another.
Property rules, on the other hand, are best applied in situations where rights
and rights-holders are known and transactions costs are low, so that the parties
can presumably organize a trade for themselves.' 4
For all its richly deserved fame, however, The Cathedral presents a few
rhetorical puzzles. One of these occurs in a peculiar choice of language about
the ways that the different rules "protect" entitlements. The protection of
entitlements through "property rules" seems intuitively obvious, and hence this
choice of language strikes a reader as unproblematic. But the phrase that
sounds strange is that of an entitlement "protected by" a liability rule.
5
Consider the example for the liability rule's "protection" of an entitlement.
In the garden-variety liability rule case, Calabresi and Melamed's Rule 2, the
factory owner receives the right to pollute the nearby resident's air, but must
pay damages. Yet in this case, an observer might not think that the resident has
an "entitlement protected by a liability rule" at all. Instead, she might think
that the liability rule simply divides the entitlement differently and that the
liability rule yields a different and diminished entitlement for the homeowner.
Compare the liability rule regime with either property rule: In the latter, the
12. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972); see also Krier &
Schwab, supra note 2, at 444-45 (describing intellectual history of Rule 4).
13. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 (1986); see also Krier &
Schwab, supra note 2, at 450 (describing Calabresi and Melamed's transaction cost prescription as
"conventional answer").
14. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1108-10. Krier and Schwab point out that courts may
do a poor job of assessing damages when transaction costs are high. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 2,
at 450-51; see also POSNER, supra note 13, at 62 n.5 (arguing that injunctive remedies may be preferable
where courts cannot assess damages accurately); cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 750-51 (arguing
that injunctive remedies pose even greater assessment problems for courts).
15. See Morris, supra note 3, at 842 (noting oddity of using language of "protection" where right may
be subject to forced sale). Morris cites Coleman & Kraus, supra note 3, at 1338-39, who note that liability
rule "protection" seems incompatible with the view of rights as spheres of liberty or autonomy. Coleman
and Kraus conclude, however, that liability rules can "protect" rights by making their violation more costly.
See id. at 1370-71.
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entitlement holder has the whole meatball, so to speak, and the other party has
nothing-one has property, the other has zip. Under either of the two liability
rules, on the other hand, the meatball gets split: The factory has an option to
pollute (or once exercised, an easement), while the homeowner has a property
right subject to an option (or easement). For the sake of simplicity, I will refer
to this latter kind of right as a PRSTO (or PRSTE), for "property right subject
to an option (or easement)."
Thus the choice of rules affects the content of entitlements, a point that
scholars have noticed for some time. 6 Mitchell Polinsky has remarked on the
reasons why the PRSTO is not the same or as capacious as the property rule
entitlement: When the option is exercised, the PRSTO holder receives none of
the gains from trade. 7 In Ayres and Talley's more recent analysis, the
authors simply assume that liability rules split the whole meatball into an
option and what I am calling a PRSTO. 8
Why, then, did Calabresi and Melamed use this peculiar elocution of
entitlements "protected by a liability rule," instead of just noting the different
division of the meatball into alternative classes of entitlements? I think the
answer lies in a shadow example, but the reason becomes clearer when one
considers a second rhetorical puzzle in The Cathedral. This puzzle is about the
famous Rule 4. Rule 4 seemed quite novel in The Cathedral, but once one
looks at liability rules simply as dividing rights differently-moving from the
all-or-nothing, property/zip combination to the PRSTO/option combination
-then Rule 4 no longer looks in the least bit odd, or really very different from
Rule 2. Looking at these arrangements as redefined entitlements, each of the
liability rules delineates a combination of: (a) an option in one party; and (b)
a PRSTO in the other.
This scheme is especially clear in the case that became famous for
confirming Rule 4, Spur hzdustries v. Del E. Webb Development Co.'9 Here,
through the operation of the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine, a large feedlot
effectively acquired an easement to pollute the neighboring properties with
fumes and odors.20 An easement is of course a property right, but this
easement was only "protected by a liability rule": Spur Industries allowed a
subdivider, acting on behalf of the neighboring residents, to buy the easement
with the buyout price fixed at the feedlot operation's moving costs. However
16. See, e.g., Coleman & Kraus, supra note 3, at 1346
17. See Polinsky, Choice. supra note 3. at 234; Polinsky. Resohing Nuisance Dtiputes. supra note 3.
at 1091.
18. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 4, at 1041; cf. Coleman & Kraus. supra note 3. at 1357. 1370-71
(arguing that liability rules do not normally convey entitlement or justify nonconsensual takings)
19. 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
20. The "coming to the nuisance" doctrine accords some protection to nuisance activities established
prior to uses that complain about them. The doctrine itself is not without problems See Richard A Epstein.
A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE LJ 2091. 2104-05 (1997)
(arguing that "coming to the nuisance" should be interpreted in light of statutes of limitations)
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much Spur Industries has been much discussed as an example of Rule 4, it
looks like just another Rule 2: A single entitlement, here the pollution
easement, is divided into an option on the one side and a PRSTO on the
other.2" No wonder this solution showed up in an ordinary land use
conflict!22 So what was the fuss about Rule 4? Here, too, I think the answer
lies in a shadow example, an understated paradigm that actually motivated the
famous Rule 4.
One can find this shadow example by reconstructing a factual rather than
a conceptual difference between Rules 2 and 4. The basic factual scenario for
the ordinary liability rule (Rule 2) is more similar to the real-life Boomer case
than to the simplified example in The Cathedral: One person or entity (the
factory) exercises a forced sale option over rights held by many other people
(the residents). Rule 4, on the other hand, involves many people (the people
in the subdivision in Spur Industries), who exercise a forced sale option over
a right held by a single individual or entity.
23
Viewed in the light of numbers of people on the different sides of the
transaction, the real example for Rule 4-the shadow example-is eminent
domain, the legal power of the public to condemn properties needed for public
uses. In eminent domain, as in Spur Industries's application of Rule 4, large
numbers of people (usually represented by a public authority, but by a
developer in Spur Industries) force the sale of a right that is held by a single
individual or entity. Seen as eminent domain, a doctrine well known in
property law, Rule 4 does not look so unusual after all. Calabresi and
Melamed did mention eminent domain, in a very interesting and now
somewhat neglected brief discussion of institutional competence.24 As they
pointed out, the Rule 4 scenario (many property owners forcing a sale from
one) is not normally a judicial decision; instead, it is a legislative decision.'
But that does not make Rule 4 something unknown. Indeed, if Calabresi and
Melamed had discussed the property doctrine of eminent domain more
prominently in their discussion of Rule 4, instead of simply alluding to the
connection between eminent domain and Rule 4, then Rule 4 would have
looked rather commonplace.26 More importantly, such a discussion would
have invited an inquiry into the doctrinal and institutional constraints that do
in fact cabin the use of eminent domain in property law, limiting its disruptive
21. A rule that is actually the conceptual opposite of Rule 2 would be a "put" option: a liability rule
giving the winning party the right to force the opposite party to buy the entitlement at some established
price. See Ayres & Balkih, supra note 4, at 731-33; Morris, supra note 3, at 854-56.
22. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at 444-45 (describing Spur Industries ruling).
23. In Spur Industries, the right that was bought was the feedlot's effective easement to pollute. See
494 P.2d at 704.
24. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1122.
25. See id.
26. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at 476 (noting that Rule 4 becomes "quite tractable" when one
considers judicial and administrative solutions).
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impact on normal property rights.27
Calabresi and Melamed's neglect of the property law aspects of Rule 4
allows us to return with new insight to the odd terminology of "entitlements
protected by liability rules," and to discern in this language an even more
central instance of the shadow example. In this peculiar rhetorical choice,
Calabresi and Melamed really seem to have been thinking of the law of
accidents--or most likely, of The Costs of Accidents,' which Guido Calabresi
had recently published.
When some unidentified person accidentally smashes your car and pays
you damages in compensation, you do not think that this person has an
"option" while you have a PRSTO. You think that you and she are caught in
a muddle, where rights have suddenly and accidentally gotten all confused. A
liability rule is the best that you can do after your car is wrecked. Your
property in the car has turned into a PRSTO, not because anybody thinks it is
a good idea to define it that way, but because nobody can do anything better
for you now that it is ruined.
Much the same can be said of the normal Rule 4 scenario, that is, eminent
domain, but for different reasons. The state may have an "option" of sorts over
your property, but any such option is so broadly but thinly applicable that
perfectly sensible people may pay little attention to it in advance.2'9 The legal
constraints on this power rein in the occasions on which it can apply, and if
your property is taken by eminent domain, it is apt to be a kind of surprise,
hitting you the way an accident hits you; it is not something that you thought
much about in advance. You do not start to think about the state's "option"
until the government starts to figure out plans for the highway. By contrast, an
ordinary option is a well-defined and specified property right, one that is
normally purchased from another property owner. It is a right that people do
27. See Epstein, supra note 20, at 2112-20 (noting doctrinal and institutional lumits on eminent
domain); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use. 72 CORNEL. L REv 61. 77-81.
97-102 (1986) (arguing that procedural difficulties deter use of eminent domain in "thick markets" and
pattern is reinforced by judicial interpretations of "public use") Considerations akin to "public use" played
a role in the Spur Industries case as well. See Spur Industries. 494 P.2d at 707-08 (discussing both
immunity of public from "coming to the nuisance" doctrine and mixed public and private characterstics
of case).
28. GurDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND Eco,'o.iic ANALYSIS (1970)
29. Eminent domain planning may occur in some contexts, for example long-term leases See Victor
P. Goldberg et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain: %iluig and Apportionmng Condemnation
Awards Betveen Landlord and Tenant, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1083. 1088-91 (1987) It is not clear how
widespread this practice is, however. As Goldberg et al. note, the low probability of eminent domain might
make ex ante contingency clauses not worth the bargaining effort. See id at 1108 n.57 The chief case
discussed in their article, Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co v. United States, 409 U S 470
(1973), appears to have had no such condemnation clause. See Goldberg ct al.. supra. at 1128 Some 0t
the condemnation clauses discussed apparently stemmed from the older draconian rules that would have
required the tenant to pay rent after condemnation. See id. at 1121-22 Several others seem rather vague.
e.g., some use "wait and see" devices like arbitration, suggesting that the paties did not think it worth the
effort to specify precise rights in advance. See id. at 1115 n.71 (describing arbitration clauses and other cx
post clauses).
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think about in advance. In fact, that quality of specificity is more or less what
everyone means by a property right: It is an entitlement that is fairly well-
defined, fairly well thought out, and bargained over in advance.
Accidents, then, make up the shadow example that drives Calabresi and
Melamed to talk about "entitlements protected by a liability rule." Where
liability rules come into play, you think (until you are surprised) that you have
the whole meatball, not a mere PRSTO. Indeed, vis-A-vis intentional
trespassers or thieves, you generally do have the whole meatball. But because
the occasion for the liability rule "option" is either an accident or an
emergency or a public necessity, it does not usually occur to you that the
meatball is divided into your PRSTO and someone else's option.
Thus The Cathedral's terminology, the "entitlement protected by a liability
rule" rather than the language of PRSTOs and options, flowed from Calabresi
and Melamed's conception of occasions for liability rules. Those occasions
were accidents, not admitting of claims that are well-defined or bargained over
in advance. Because people do not think much about the free-floating options
that are exercised in accidents, they go ahead and do the things with their
property that property regimes encourage people to do: invest, plan, and work
hard in the expectation of taking home the proceeds.3" Owners do those
things because they think, mistakenly as it sometimes turns out, that they have
the whole meatball, and they only later find out that the entitlement was
"protected" by a mere liability rule.
In short, then, Calabresi and Melamed's very terminology suggests that the
rights established by liability rules are in a sense merely accidental rights. It
is on this point that two of the recent property rules/liability rules pieces take
exception. Ayres and Talley in one article,3' and Kaplow and Shavell in
another,32 want to rescue liability rules from their accidental status, and
instead use them as more consciously chosen instruments. In their work as in
Calabresi and Melamed's, however, understated shadow examples play an
important role in driving the analysis. And in their work, as in Calabresi and
Melamed's, the pattern of shadow examples leads the authors to neglect the
different roles that real-life property regimes might play.
II. AYRES AND TALLEY'S DIVIDED ENTITLEMENTS:
THE SHADOW OF CONTRACTS
In Ayres and Talley's Solomonic Bargaining, the authors begin by clearing
away the terminological lumber left over from The Cathedral. They explicitly
discuss why entitlements "protected" by liability rules effectively divide the
30. For the classic statement, see JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 109-22 (C.K.
Ogden ed., 1931).
31. Ayres & Talley, supra note 4.
32. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4.
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underlying entitlement into two different entitlements: one party holds an
option while the other holds a property right subject to an option, or what I
have called a PRSTO 3 The authors argue that the entitlements defined by
liability rules, both options and PRSTOs, can themselves be the subject of
bargains. Indeed, their basic claim is that liability rules may induce more and
better refined bargaining than property rules do.'
Ayres and Talley are generally more cautious about examples than
Calabresi and Melamed, and their text generally avoids identifying the
"entitlements" they have in mind. Nevertheless, they open with a few
references to that unmistakable example of real property, "Blackacre,"" while
a polluting factory shows up at some length. 6 Their footnote examples are
also generally about real estate: A farmer,3' a mall,"' and some mined
land39 make appearances, alongside the old standbys of Boomer ° and Spur
Industries.4
There is a reason for using these real property examples. Ayres and Talley
are interested in situations in which two parties are stuck with each other, thin
markets instead of "thick" ones.42 Neighboring landowners seem to fit that
bill. Like Calabresi and Melamed, however, Ayres and Talley abstract away
one critical feature from the two classic cases, Boomer and Spur Industries:
They remove the large numbers of participants in those cases, and instead treat
nuisances as two-party matters-one resident who receives polluting matter,
and the other whose activities produce it. For Ayres and Talley, it really does
not matter which party holds the option and which holds the PRSTO; the
important point is that both parties can bargain over their respective rights.
That is, the option holder can try to buy the PRSTO, or alternatively the
PRSTO holder can try to buy the option.
Now one might think that bargaining is clearly possible when the numbers
are small, because that is the scenario in which parties understand the contours
of their rights. They understand which one of them has a PRSTO and which
has an option, although they might call the option something else, for example,
a right-of-way or a flowage right. One might also think that such parties could
bargain equally well under a property rule, where one party held the whole
meatball and the other held zip. Where numbers are small and rights are well-
33. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 4, at 1031
34. See id. at 1032-33.
35. See id. at 1030-31, 1034.
36. See id. at 1078-79.
37. See id. at 1047 n.64.
38. See id. at 1031 n.9.
39. See id. at 1061 n.105.
40. See id. at 1062 n.106 (citing Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.. 257 N-E 2d 870 (N Y 1970))
41. See id. at 1086 n.183 (citing Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev Co.. 494 P2d 700 (Anz_ 1972));
see also id. at 1091 (describing endangered species habitat); id at 1092-94 (describing intellectual
property).
42. See id. at 1030.
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defined, it would seem to follow that transaction costs drop and the parties will
bargain under any circumstances, whether under a liability rule or property
rule.43
Not so, say Ayres and Talley. Why not? The reason, they say, stems from
a different kind of transaction cost or bargaining impediment. They do not care
much about difficulties that may result from having to find and assemble
numerous or indistinctly defined interested parties, the costs that come prior
to bargaining altogether, which I will call Type I Transaction Costs. Ayres and
Talley are interested instead in Type II Transaction Costs: the impediments that
come after bargaining begins, from parties who are close-mouthed, poker-
faced, strategically bargaining misanthropes. 44 The literature on trust suggests
that suspicious people are likely to be untrustworthy, precisely because of their
mistrust;45 and Ayres and Talley's bargainers fit the picture perfectly. These
doubters and suspecters will never willingly give up their respective
advantageous secrets, even though revealing such private information is the
only thing that might facilitate mutually beneficial deals. Thus even where
rights are well-defined and rights-holders well-known, if each party is stuck
with the other as the only potential trading partner-the ultimate "thin" market
of bilateral monopoly-they could go on jockeying forever.
That is, they could carry on that way unless the structure of entitlements
induced them to do what is needed, to squeeze out that private information
from one or both of them. This, say Ayres and Talley, is where the division
of entitlements helps. Why? In one sense, the division between option and
PRSTO helps the bargaining because less is at stake for each. Each is only
dickering over the other's option (or PRSTO), but at the end of the day, either
party could wind up with the whole meatball, and this pattern moderates nasty
behavior.4 Moreover, say Ayres and Talley, the option/PRSTO division
forces more information onto the bargaining table. The PRSTO holder who
will not dicker to stave off the option's exercise--or who even offers to sell
her own interest for less than the option price-reveals her own relatively low
valuation on the whole meatball; but if she does bid to hold off the option, she
shows that she has a relatively high value. Thus, as Ayres and Talley put it,
the liability rule option "partitions" PRSTO holders into higher- and lower-
43. This is essentially the position taken by Kaplow and Shavell with respect to situations of one
injurer and one victim. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 732-33 (maintaining that where bargaining
is possible and successful, choice of rule does not matter); id. at 734-37 (explaining that where bargaining
is possible but not successful, neither rule necessarily dominates).
44. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 4, at 1029-30, 1035-36. Dale Nance believes that a misanthropic
view of human nature was already present in the original Cathedral's analysis. See Dale A. Nance,
Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral 18-19 (Feb. 1, 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
45. See Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. R'v. 531, 540-41 (1995).
46. Ayres and Talley refer to the uncertainty of the outcome as an "identity crisis" that reduces the
bargainers' incentives to lie about their valuations. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 4, at 1027.
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value bidders, signaling the opposite party about their otherwise private
valuations, and thus greasing the wheels of bargaining. 7
Notice that Ayres and Talley's parties are really only bargaining about
property rights. To be sure, in the first instance, ordinary usage no doubt
associates "property" with the whole meatball, the combined entitlement; but
this usage is no more than what Ayres has called a "default" position, i.e., a
fallback position that can be changed in actual transactions. " When the
features of an option are described, it is clearly a property right. So is the
PRSTO, although defined as it is as the subject of a "liability rule," it can be
taken for a payment. In standard real estate markets, both entitlements would
be known entities, held by known persons, and both rights would have market
values; indeed, they might both be purchasable by third parties. Those elements
generally include all that anyone means by a property right: an entitlement of
which the basic features are known, the holders are identifiable, and about
which people can bargain. That is, there are no serious Type I transaction
costs.
Thus an interesting feature of Ayres and Talley's analysis is the message
of its overall approach: It makes explicit the point that liability rules need not
apply only in scenarios of the classic Type I transaction costs so central to
liability rules for Calabresi and Melamed-where entitlements are only vaguely
understood, or where there are so many interested parties that bargaining can
scarcely get underway. Instead, even where rights are defined and parties can
bargain, liability rules can redefine the entitlements and become a part of a
new bargaining process. In this role, in Ayres and Talley's analysis, liability
rules can soften the next layer of transaction costs, the Type II costs of
strategic bargaining after the parties sit down.
But here is a puzzle: If the divided rights of liability rules are so
advantageous, why do we so seldom observe such divisions in the chief
domain where the article gives us examples, that is, real estate'. 9 If Ayres
47. See id. at 1044. They point out, however, that option holders can still misrepresent their private
valuations. See id. at 1047.
In a comment, Kaplow and Shavell indicate some problems with Ayres and Talley's analysis.
stemming from Kaplow and Shavell's argument that liability rules would have been superior to property
rules even without the subsequent bargaining. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Labilhty Rules
Facilitate Bargaining?: A Reply to Ayres and Talley. 105 YA.U LJ 221 (1995) This caused Ayres and
Talley to modify their original position. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley. Distinguishing Betn ten Consensual
and Nonconsensual Advantages ofLiability Rules, 105 YALE L-i 235 (1995) (modifying their position to
factor in litigation costs).
48. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts- An Economic 77teorv of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
49. In contracts for the purchase and sale of real estate, one might characterie the buyer's right to
buy (and the seller's right to sell or "put") as an "option," but the sale contract is ordinarily only a
preliminary for the transfer of the entire estate, and not a device creating an ongoing division of
entitlements. Moreover, since both buyer and seller can normally enforce real estate contracts through
specific performance, what one might call their respective "options" are enforced through property rules
rather than liability rules. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTACTs § 360 cmt. e (1981) (describing
general pattern of specific performance in real estate contracts) This pattern is reflected in the traditional
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and Talley are right that the PRSTO/option combination makes transactions
smoother, we certainly could expect to see such arrangements organized
through voluntary transactions in the real estate market. Anything that greases
deals should make a property more valuable, and surely some real estate
moguls ought to notice. After all, there are many dealers in real estate, and
they have figured out ways to make a profit from devices that divide rights in
vastly more complex ways than options-condominiums and time-shares, for
example. So why do we not see the PRSTO/option arrangement more often?
The answer is that the PRSTO/option arrangement is not as unproblematically
advantageous as Ayres and Talley suggest. Indeed, Ayres and Talley finesse
a number of rather curious features of the bargains between PRSTO-holders
and option-holders.
For starters, look at the oddity of these parties' bargaining: What are they
bargaining about? The option-holder is bargaining for the other party's
PRSTO, and the PRSTO-holder is bargaining for the other's option.
Ultimately, the option and the PRSTO are united. At the end of the day, then,
these parties' whole object is to move from two shared entitlements with two
entitlement-holders, right back to the plain old property/zip scenario, where
only one party has the whole meatball. Now, why would they do this? Why
move from a smooth-transaction, divided-rights situation, back to the bumpy
single-ownership arrangement, where the grumpiness, secretiveness, and
suspiciousness of the parties gains full sway? It seems that somehow, the
divided interests of PRSTO and option are only advantageous when the
respective owners are trying to shed the underlying division, to get back to the
one-owner, single meatball, property/zip arrangement. Something is amiss here.
Something else is amiss too, something even bigger. Where did the
PRSTO/option arrangement come from, anyway? It is not a default rule in
ordinary property law, except in the context of unexpected events like
accidents and eminent domain, where liability rules do govern. Quite the
contrary, the usual default rule for property is that the whole meatball is
transmitted from one whole owner to the next whole owner. If we take that
very ordinary default rule as a given for the moment, then an entitlement
would only be divided into an option and a PRSTO if some earlier transaction
had done the dividing, a preliminary transaction that Ayres and Talley do not
discuss at all. Ayres and Talley bring us into the middle of this two-step
process, where one party or the other is attempting to reunite the option and
the PRSTO. But these parties are not at the first step; they are already at the
second step. Thus Ayres and Talley are comparing the bad old property/zip
doctrine of "equitable conversion," through which the buyer is characterized as the equitable owner of the
property from the time of executing the sale contract, effectively eliminating any "option" in the sense of
a choice between purchase and damages. See RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON
REAL PROPERTY T 881, § 1 (1996) (describing "equitable conversion" and linking doctrine to specific
performance of real estate contracts).
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bargains to only half of a two-step process that first divides and then reunites
the PRSTO with the option. No wonder, then, that the PRSTO/option bargain
looks like a comparatively neat transaction; it is only the second half of two
necessary transactions. Compared to two transactions instead of one, the
grumpy old property/zip bargain might not look so bad.
This of course leads to the question why property/zip seems to be the
default rule in most property arrangements. It may be that in the bulk of
property transactions, the advantages of property rules simply swamp whatever
disadvantages they carry. The usual roles of property rules-defining rights
and identifying rights-holders-not only counteract Type I transaction costs in
deals, but also encourage individual investment, planning, and effort, because
actors have a clearer sense of what they are getting. Perhaps in the legal areas
commonly designated as "property," including that most common of property
examples, real estate, the importance of these functions simply dwarfs any
problems that arise when property rules exacerbate strategic bargaining-the
Type II transaction costs that so interest Ayres and Talleyi 0
This raises the issue of the shadow example, the off-scene paradigm case
that drives the analysis: Ayres and Talley are not really thinking about real
estate. Those footnote references to Boomer and Spur Industries are essentially
a smokescreen. No, Ayres and Talley are thinking about contracts. Contractual
rights are the perfect example of the bargaining that Ayres and Talley want to
discuss. The contractual relationship has only a discrete number of
parties-paradigmatically two-who (a) presumably know what they are doing,
and (b) are stuck with each other. In fact, they are engaged in a kind of small
and very specialized joint enterprise, and their bargaining difficulties are not
those of the old-fashioned Type I transaction costs, i.e., large numbers or
indefinite rights. Instead, the contracting parties are plagued only by Type II
strategic bargaining, where information-forcing is essential, and where the
partitioning effect of a liability rule might have some real use.
More importantly, in contract law, liability rules, not property rules, do
indeed constitute the background default rule: The parties are supposed to
perform, but except in particular circumstances (mostly real estate!) they have
the option of defaulting and paying damages instead of performing. That is to
say, Party A can "take" Party B's contractual right under a liability rule.5'
50. Ayres in particular has recognized a tradeoff between the concerns of effort ("moral hazard) and
strategic bargaining ("adverse selection"). See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text His work with
Balkin denies that property eases bargaining, but he does not distinguish between the different kind of
bargaining problems that arise with Type I and Type II transaction costs. See Ayres & Balkin. supra note
4, at 714-15. My own view is that property rules can enhance bargaining by overcoming Type I costs
(finding parties, clarifying rights), but may at the same time exacerbate Type 1 costs (strategic bargaining).
at least in conditions of bilateral monopoly.
51. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN. LAW AND EcoNomics 289-92 (1988) (descnbing habilty
as preferred rule in contract law and explaining preference as fostering efficient breach). The dominance
of liability rules in contract has been challenged, however. See Daniel Fnedmann. 77te Efficient Breach
Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL, STUD. 1, 1-8 (1989) (describing contractual rights as property of promisee); Alan
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Because liability is indeed the background rule in contract, no two-step process
is needed to establish an option and a PRSTO; contract's background law gives
them this division right from the get-go.
Ayres and Talley do talk briefly about the shadow example of contract,
and when they do, they make some important and well-illustrated points. 2
But why not stick with contracts, instead of talking of "entitlements" more
generally? Perhaps the contracts questions taken alone seemed too limited. All
the same, there would have been interesting issues to explore simply about
contract law, and about the ways that liability rules might bear on
postcontractual bargaining between contract partners.53 Ian Ayres's most
recent contribution to this subject (with Jack Balkin) takes up even further
partitioning effects of liability rules, but it is encouraging to see that this latest
contribution moves at least some moderate distance-though perhaps not far
enough--toward an explicit discussion of contracts. 4
In Ayres and Talley, then, as in Calabresi and Melamed, property
examples front for an analysis that would more cogently apply in a different
legal area. Once again, in this very provocative work, the pattern of shadow
examples unfortunately deflects attention from the considerations uppermost
in conventional property law-planning, effort, and investment.55
III. KAPLOW AND SHAVELL'S ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES:
THE SHADOW OF ACCIDENTS (AGAIN)
Kaplow and Shavell's wide-ranging article, Property Rules Versus Liability
Rules56 echoes Ayres and Talley's Solomonic Bargaining in expanding the
claims for liability rules under certain circumstances. That expansion will be
the focus of the discussion here, because it continues the pattern of the shadow
example, showcasing Boomer's environmental pollution while actually using
a quite different driving paradigm. Kaplow and Shavell also make a very
interesting set of defenses of property rules under some other circumstances,
defenses that I will describe briefly.
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (explaining why specific
performance is preferable to liability remedies in contract).
52. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 4, at 1094-96 (discussing usefulness of liability rules in contracts'
circumstances of idiosyncratic gains from trade, or relation-specific investments).
53. For example, historic doctrines curtailed postcontractual renegotiations, presumably to restrain
contractual parties from taking advantage of each other when conditions change. See, e.g., Alaska Packers'
Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902) (forbidding employees on distant fishing expedition from
demanding higher wages than initially agreed upon). Such doctrines could have been compared to the more
lenient position of modem courts on such renegotiations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
89 (1981) (permitting contractual modifications under unanticipated circumstances).
54. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 4, at 745-47 (using contract example).
55. See supra text accompanying note 30.
56. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4.
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Kaplow and Shavell divide the world of entitlements into a kind of four-
square box: A major vertical slice, as it were, divides entitlements that they
call "externalities" from entitlements that they call "possessory."" To
illustrate the difference, they cite among other things air pollution and noise
(including the ubiquitous Booner) as examples of negative "externalities,""5
and laptop computers as their principal example of "'possessory things." 9
Then across these two major domains, they take a horizontal slice that
separates scenarios in which the parties can bargain from those in which
bargaining is impeded. ° This results in four quartiles, two in the "externality"
domain and two in the "possessory" domain. Kaplow and Shavell's effort then
is to identify the quartiles in which liability rules are superior to property rules,
and vice versa.
Briefly, their conclusion is that property rules are superior with respect to
both of the two "possessory" quartiles. One very ingenious reason is that with
respect to this kind of right, liability rules might be a two-way street. That is,
to use Kaplow and Shavell's example, if the laptop computer may be taken at
some fixed damage amount, the owner may simply take it back at the same
fixed amount, leading to an infinite round of reciprocal takes and take-
backs.6 Third parties may enter the fray as well, adding another whole
dimension of mutual takings.62 Thus with what Kaplow and Shavell call
"possessory" rights, they conclude that liability rules are inferior, because
liability takings destabilize fights in an undesirable fashion.63
The "externality" quartiles present a more mixed picture. Here Kaplow and
Shavell say that in the quartile where the parties can bargain successfully,
liability rules and property rules come out a wash; neither rule is superior.'
This conclusion differs from Ayres and Talley's analysis, but it may not strike
the reader as intuitively surprising. As we saw with Ayres and Talley, it would
seem that the bargainable rights under liability rules are really only options and
PRSTOs, or perhaps easements and PRSTEs; they are simply different
divisions of property rights. Thus it hardly seems surprising that property rules
and liability rules come out a wash in this quartile; if the parties can bargain,
all the rights are in a sense property rights, giving opportunities for mutually
beneficial trades without the bother of Type I transaction costs. Indeed, the
greater surprise is that Kaplow and Shavell refer to any of these rights as
57. See id. at 715-23, 757.
58. See id. at 717 n.4.
59. See id. at 76!.
60. See id. at 723-24, 732, 759, 763.
61. This analysis creates certain difficulties for the Ayres and Talley analysts of liability rules In his
new article with Jack Balkin, Ian Ayres discusses a system of graduated liability charges. in part to
overcome this mutual takings problem. See Ayres & Balkin. supra note 4. at 707-11
62. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 765-67
63. See id. at 767-68.
64. See id. at 732-37.
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"externalities" at all, given that such bargainable rights should internalize any
externalities. 5
The remaining quartile, however, that of externalities over which the
parties cannot bargain, is the location in which Kaplow and Shavell find
liability rules to be decisively superior. Here again, readers may find the claims
for liability rules unsurprising in this nonbargaining quartile, because that
conclusion squares with Calabresi and Melamed's claim of a quarter of a
century ago. Kaplow and Shavell argue, however, that their reasons are
different from Calabresi and Melamed's and also more cogent, and that their
reasoning has more direct application to modem regulatory choices, especially
environmental management."
Why do Kaplow and Shavell find liability rules so superior in this
quartile? Their reasoning draws on an insight from one of Mitchell Polinsky's
early-1980s trio of articles about property rules and liability rules.67 The
argument, very roughly, is the following: Where the parties cannot bargain
easily to allocate rights-say, a right to intrude, like pollution-that allocation
has to fall to some deus ex machina, which Kaplow and Shavell call "the
court" or "the state."6" If the court were to use a property rule, it would
optimally allocate the right to intrude to the intruder if the cost of prevention
is higher than the damage to the intruded-upon person(s), and to the victims
if their damage is greater than the prevention cost of the intruder. 9
65. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and tite Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource,
13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 50-51 (1970) (attributing "externality" to incomplete contracting). The "externality"
designation is nevertheless used by others as well even where parties can bargain. See, e.g., Polinsky,
Controlling Externalities, supra note 3, at 5. My own view is that "externality" is a misleading term for
what Kaplow and Shavell have in mind. Kaplow and Shavell seem to intend a use that intrudes onto
another property. Such a use may be held as of right, of course, as in an easement, just as a "possessory"
laptop computer is held as of right. However, all users of laptop computers, as Kaplow and Shavell point
out, are likely to use the computer in the same way: They have a "common value" for it. By contrast, the
easement holder normally uses the easement differently from the way in which the servient tenement owner
would use it. For example, a back lot resident might have a driveway easement across a front lot, but if
the front lot owner reacquires this easement, she might devote the space to a garden, since she does not
care about getting to the back lot. That is, the two users would have "independent values" for their
respective uses of the easement right. Similarly, the factory would use a pollution easement to pollute,
whereas the resident would use the reacquired easement to curtail pollution. The difference in the parties'
respective uses or values suggests one reason why, in practice, liability rules for "common value" things
might be subject to the reciprocal iaking problem, while liability rules for intrusion rights, which have
independent values to the parties, would be more likely to "stick" as one-way streets, or as what Ayres and
Balkin would describe as "first-order" liability rules. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 4, at 710.
66. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 717-18 (distinguishing their own views from those in
other liability rule literature and noting importance for environmental regulation); id. at 748-52 (applying
their theory to environmental regulation).
67. See Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes, supra note 3, at 1100-02, cited in Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 4, at 725 n.35.
68. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 719 (referring to decisionmaker as "court"); id. at 724-28
(referring to decisionmaker as "the state").
69. See id. at 724-25 (describing allocation of property right with perfect information). With perfect




Here is the Polinsky insight, upon which Kaplow and Shavell build: If the
court decides under a property rule, allocating a full property right to one side
or the other, it must know both the damage costs to the victims and the
prevention costs to the intruder.7" Yet the situation is different if the court
uses liability rules: In that case, the court only needs to know the damages to
the victim, because the intruder herself will decide whether those damages
outweigh her prevention costs. 71 If the prevention costs are greater, she will
continue to intrude and pay the damages; if not, she will pay for prevention
and thus stop intruding. Liability rules therefore allow the court to economize
on information.72 According to Kaplow and Shavell, this economizing factor,
rather than Calabresi and Melamed's explanation that transaction costs are
simply too high for private bargains, is the reason why liability rules are
preferable to property rules in nonbargaining "externalities" situations.73
The opening examples for such externalities once again come largely from
environmental nuisances such as smoke.74 Indeed in these instances, Booner
would be perfect: one big polluting factory surrounded by many little pollution
victims. The court assesses the total cost to the victims, tells the Booner
factory manager that this is the price of continued pollution; the manager
assesses her own prevention costs and decides whether to pay those prevention
costs or, alternatively, to continue polluting while paying the assessed smoke
damage. A liability rule thus allows the court to minimize administrative costs,
because it only has to determine one side of the prevention/damage equation
while the better-informed polluter herself determines the other side.75 This is
unlike a property approach, which forces the court to establish information on
both sides.
The next step is an application to the real world, and here is where the
problems begin-including, as we shall see, another shadow example problem.
The liability rule solution, say Kaplow and Shavell, should be generalized to
environmental law, because it is cheaper than any property solution.76 Like
many modem commentators on environmental legislation, Kaplow and Shavell
70. See id. at 725-27; Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes. supra note 3. at 1100-02 More than
Kaplow and Shavell, however, Polinsky stresses that the court must make a correct assessment of damages.
because Polinsky thinks strategic bargaining impedes further refinements by the paties See Polsky.
Resolving Nuisance Disputes, supra note 3. at 1102.
71. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 725-27; Polinsky. Resohing Nu:5ance Disputes, supra
note 3, at 1100-02.
72. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4. at 719, 726-27
73. There is a glimpse of this argument in Calabresi and Melamed as we-ll. however See Calabrcsi
& Melamed, supra note 1, at 1097 n.19. But see Krier & Schwab. supra note 2. at 459-464. 467-68. 474
(criticizing liability rules on ground that very reasons that private paries cannot bargain are same reisons
why courts may be poor assessors of damages and arguing further that judicial decisionmaking may
undermine private bargaining).
74. See Kaplow & ShaveU, supra note 4. at 716-17. 723
75. See id. at 725 n.36, 751 n.122 (maintaining that polluter's inormation about prevention costs is
better than state's).
76. See id. at 748-52.
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have little use for direct command-and-control environmental rules, the rules
that say that you must have this or that type of scrubber at the end of your
smokestack." Kaplow and Shavell dub these "property rule" solutions,78 but
this seems a bit of a gratuitous slap at property rules. In the original Calabresi
and Melamed classification, command-and-control rules seem to fit most easily
as "inalienability" rules.79 Indeed, insofar as the punishment for violation is
a fixed fine, command-and-control regimes look rather like liability rules.80
In any event, that is not the kind of property rule that anyone in modem
environmental discussions cares about. As Kaplow and Shavell are aware, the
property-like rules that are now on every tongue are tradeable emission
rights."' These rights derive from the following process: First, the
decisionmaker establishes a tolerable overall quantity of pollution; second, she
divides that total allowable quantity of pollution into small individual emission
allotments or entitlements; third, she allocates those small emission
entitlements to entities that want them (in the best case by auction, but any
allocation will do); and finally, she lets the owners trade these entitlements
until the limited pollution rights come to rest in the hands of those who value
them most. 82 Although the primary goal of this scheme is to limit pollution
damage, the method has some advantages for polluters. Those who can prevent
at low cost can avoid the expense of buying pollution rights, and they can even
sell their pollution entitlements to others; those who have higher prevention
costs must buy their pollution rights, but they can do so from those with lower
prevention costs. Because pollution control becomes a valuable activity for
which there is a market, all these polluters will have appropriate incentives to
figure out least-cost ways to reduce total pollution, which once again redounds
to the benefit of pollution victims.
77. See id. at 748-57; see also Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1334-39 (1985) (describing direct technology-based, command-and-control
standards as inefficient); Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why Is This
Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 217, 219-22 (1988) (same); Note, Technology.Based
Emission and Effluent Standards and the Achievement of Ambient Environmental Objectives, 91 YALE L.J.
792, 793 (1982) (same).
78. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 748 (describing "direct regulation" as "property rule").
79. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092-93.
80. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 753, who make this point with respect to fines for traffic
violations.
81. See, e.g., Deborah M. Mostaghel, State Reactions to the Trading of Emissions Allowances Under
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 201 (1995) (describing
state regulatory impediments to current tradeable emission rights approaches); Richard B. Stewart, United
States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 591-94 (proposing tradeable
emission rights along with emission fees as antidote to command-and-control regulations); David Sohn &
Madeline Cohen, Note, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the Tradable Permit Approach from Air
Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 405 (1996) (discussing extensions of tradeable
emissions approaches to other environmental areas).
82. See, e.g., J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES 93-97 (1968) (describing tradeable
pollution rights schemes); Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 77, at 1341-51 (same).
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But Kaplow and Shavell are not fans of this property-like solution. They
say that the critical step is the first one, in which the decisionmaker sets the
overall quantity. In setting that quantity, Kaplow and Shavell argue, the
decisionmaker has to know both the environmental damage and the costs of
prevention.8 3 It is better to use a liability rule: Let the court simply determine
the average damage caused by pollution, set that damage as a cost of pollution,
and watch as the polluters themselves determine their own prevention costs and
arrive at optimal pollution rates. That is the way to economize on information
costs.
There is a great deal of force in this argument. In the environmental
context, however, there are two important caveats, and together they make the
property rights approaches relatively more attractive, and the liability rules
approaches less so. The first caveat is that pollution harms are more than
simply linearly additive. The marginal cost of an additional dose of pollution
is very likely to be higher than the marginal cost of the preceding dose. '
Two gidgets of pollution may cause no damage (like a tiny drop of iodine),
whereas twenty gidgets can kill you (like a teaspoon of iodine). Indeed, in a
typical environmental nuisance case, a small dose of pollution is not likely to
cause a lot of harm. Air currents will disperse fumes, and small amounts of,
say, sulphur dioxide, will not cause much if any damage to anything." But
when ten factories start emitting sulphur dioxide, and when the amount of
pollution rises proportionately, the damage rises more than proportionately.
Those ten factories raise the second caveat, and it is again linked to a
misplaced choice of examples. Put briefly, the environmental context is not the
Boomer-like nuisance, where one polluting factory confronts many pollution
victims. The typical environmental context includes not only many pollution
victims, but also many polluting factories. This combination-increasing
marginal pollution damage, together with multiple polluters-has serious
implications for a liability rule in which the decisionmaker sets the costs at the
average damage. The average is too high for the first polluter, and too low for
83. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 750-51.
84. See. e.g., Benjamin G. Ferris, Jr.. Sulfur Dioxide: A Scientists Wei%. ti Ttit ScIc-'wiC BASIS OF
HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 253, 257-59 (Robert W Crandall & Lester B Lave cds. 1981)
(reporting studies of progressively increasing health effects from incremsing levels of air pollutants) The
presumption of the Clean Air Act is that for the major pollutants subject to *'primary standards." there are
no significant health effects below certain levels. See Lester B, Lave. Sulfur Dioxide An Economisr's iew.
in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION, supra. at 267. 267--68 Precise calculation
of dose-response is extremely complex, however, particularly at low levels. See. e g . Ben P Krages II.
Rats in the Courtroom: T7he Admissibility of Animal Studies in Toxic Tort Cases, 2 J ENw't. L & LIMI
229, 241-44 (1987) (describing uncertainties about low-level exposure extrapolated from high dosages in
animal experimentations). For a summary of some controversies concerming dose-response patterns,
particularly relating to carcinogens, see EDWARD J. CALABRESE, PRINCIPLES OF ANIMAL ExTRAPOLATION
529-36 (1983).
85. For this reason, for example, the Clean Air Act gives limited credit for dispersal techniques such
as tall stacks, discussed in Sierra Club v Environmental Protection Agency, 719 F 2d 436. 439-43 (D C
Cir. 1983).
Rose 2193
The Yale Law Journal
the second, because marginal prices rise for each successive polluter; average
damages do not capture this fact.
In fact, the disparity between average costs and marginal costs, in a large
number context, is the scenario for the common pool problem often called the
"tragedy of the commons." 6 The tragedy originally was framed over the
issue of fishing: When a fisher decides to join other fishers at a particular
fishing ground, he calculates that his costs will be the average of all the other
fishers. In reality, his arrival causes everyone a little more than the previous
average cost, because the arrival of one more competitor requires each fisher
to work a little harder to catch the now-scarcer fish.87 In this sense, each
fisher imposes an externality on the others: His arrival makes their efforts
more costly, but he never "internalizes" the costs that he imposes. Similarly,
under an average-damage charge for air pollution, when a new factory owner
begins to pollute the air, she pays the average cost of all her predecessors. Yet
after her factory joins the others, the marginal damage of pollution rises, and
now all the factories are undercharged.
There is a solution, of course: Reset the "average" charge of pollution next
year, so that it more closely approximates the actual marginal costs from the
prior year, given all the polluting factories. But that "average" is a moving
target. The average pollution damage from one cement factory is less than the
average pollution damage of two, or of ten. Ten factories' pollution results in
more than ten times the number of respiratory ailments and dead trees. Thus
the decisionmaker cannot set an appropriate "average" damage per unit without
knowing the total quantity of pollution. In fact, this is not really setting an
average at all; this is trying to approximate a marginal cost. That is much
trickier, because to guess the appropriate charge, pollution quantities must be
approximated as well.
Moreover, those quantities are destabilized by the very operation of an
average-charge liability approach. Under this approach, the Boomer factory's'
average costs rise or fall depending on neighboring factories' activities. In
effect, the factory in Boomer is in competition with the neighboring plants; if
they did not pollute so much, the Boomer factory would have to pay less in
average pollution damages.88 The liability regime gives these factories no way
to come to grips with the externalities they impose on one another. Quite the
contrary, the average-charge approach invites freeloading among the polluters
themselves: The new polluter can move in, pay this year's average costs (now
an undercharge), and even pay next year's somewhat higher average costs,
because she knows that once the charges are adjusted, she will be sharing that
86. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SciENcE 1243 (1968).
87. See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J.
POL. ECON. 124, 129-32 (1954).
88. All are like the fishermen or herdsmen in the classic tragedy of the commons: Each faces a higher
charge because of the entry of other actors.
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higher average with all the other factories. She neither bears the full cost of
her added pollution, nor by parallel reasoning would she take the full gains
from polluting less, since some of those gains redound to the other factories,
which now share in the lowered average damages. s9
Notice that under these circumstances, the relative disadvantage of an
average-charge liability rule can be understood through Kaplow and Shavell's
own ingenious defense of property rules for "possessory things" like laptop
computers. Because added pollution raises the average charges for all polluters,
these polluters, vis-h-vis one another, are all in competition for the very same
resources. As among themselves, pollution has what Kaplow and Shavell call
a "common value"; and as with Kaplow and Shavell's example of the laptop
computers, a liability rule ushers in a destabilizing series of new entries and
reciprocal takes and take-backs, in a competition that has no resolution.
Indeed, this situation-multiple resource users and rising marginal
costs-is one that most commentators think cries out for property rights
solutions. 90 The tradeable emission rights solution is precisely the same as
one of the classic solutions to the tragedy of the commons: Determine the
amount of total use that the resource-say, air--can sustain as a whole, divide
the total into mini-rights, and let those who want the rights bid against one
another. In that way, their competition can be contained; those with higher-
value uses (or higher prevention costs) will buy the rights of lower-value users
and lower-cost preventers; actors can plan and invest in the appropriate
pollution control entitlements; and total resource use is contained, while the
externalities of each party's use are internalized through the operation of
property rights.9'
Having said all that, a property rule regime like tradeable emission rights
is not easy, and it is not cheap. Such a regime's expenses include the upstream
cost of a potshot guess at polluter prevention costs. As Kaplow and Shavell
rightly point out, this is an administrative cost that may well be cheaper under
liability rules. In addition, just as a liability rule would require downstream
readjustment of pollution damage costs (in the light of total quantity), the
property rule solution is also very likely to require downstream readjustments
of total quantities (in the light of pollution ights costs). All of these respective
89. At some higher point it may be worthwhile for a factory to prevent rather than to pa, average
damages, but here too, free riding would play a role: Each factory would wat for someone else to pay the
prevention costs, lowering average damages for all the remaining polluters
90. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theorn of Property Rights. Am i Eco. RE.v . May 1967. at
347-48, 350-58 (describing development of property rights as response to common pool resource uses)
91. The closest that Kaplow and Shavell come to this point is to note that property rules may be
superior where damage costs and prevention costs are not independent, that is. where the highc-damage
use also has higher prevention costs. See Kaplow & Shavell. supra note 4. at 727 n 43. app at 777 An
unexplored reason for this superiority, however, is that with property nghts. the htgher-value users can buy
some cheap prevention from others.
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administrative costs have to be considered in assessing the relative merits of
emission rights versus liability systems.
But the other element to be considered is the one major function that the
property rule solution serves that the liability rule solution does not: The
property rule solution allows the polluters to channel their competition vis-a-vis
one another. Property rules make these common pool resource users bid
against one other and thus confront the costs they impose upon one
another-not just compete on the unmediated field of an average-charge
"'commons."
This is an advantage that Kaplow and Shavell simply do not consider.
Why not? Once again, I think the choice of examples is the root of the
problem. For much of the quartile of unbargainable externalities, Kaplow and
Shavell seem to be discussing an example based on that old standby, Boomer;
but they never give Boomer's cement factory any neighboring cement factories,
although to do so would clearly raise the problem of the well-known average
cost/marginal cost divergence in common pool resources, a divergence so
typical of environmental harms.
On the other hand, there is a much better example than any environmental
problem for Kaplow and Shavell's proposed liability regime. For the average-
cost liability rule, the right example is the automobile accident. Kaplow and
Shavell do indeed take up accidents as a secondary example, and very
interestingly, too. 92 But accidents should be front and center for an average-
cost liability rule. The reason is that in the usual case, the costs of one auto
accident are entirely separable from the costs of another. My crash at Fourth
and Main results in a great deal of damage, but that damage is utterly
unaffected by your crash at Twenty-Second and Central.
These accidents fit the Kaplow and Shavell mold perfectly. First, they fall
into the quartile of unbargainable externalities: They occur in the presence of
what I have been calling Type I transaction costs, as drivers and victims
cannot discuss precautions beforehand. Second, the costs of accidents, by and
large, are linear, not exponential; neither accident victim will be affected by
the damage suffered by the other. Here, average damage charges to tortfeasors
will work just fine, because the damages in question are unrelated. 93
Once again, then, the perfect example for the authors' approach is an
example that indeed makes an appearance, but only secondarily, in the
shadows. Their showcase example conceals the common pool issues so
commonly encountered in environmental law, where the costs of resource uses
are indeed interrelated. This analysis blurs the classic advantages of property
regimes: In situations of competition for scarce resources, property rights allow
92. See id. at 752-54.
93. A possible exception might occur if Third and Main is a dangerous corner with multiple crashes;
then costs could rise exponentially insofar as they include the rising anxieties of nearby residents.
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disparate parties to find each other, to bargain, to trade, and to leave the
bargaining table with stable entitlements that allow them to plan for their
future investments and efforts.
CONCLUSION
In some ways it seems quite natural that Calabresi and Melamed's shadow
examples would focus on accidents. After all, when The Cathedral was
published, Calabresi had just completed The Costs of Accidents. It seems
equally natural that Ayres and Talley would be thinking about contracts; Ayres
is one of the eminent contracts scholars of his generation, and Talley seems
well on the way to joining him. It is natural too that Kaplow and Shavell
would have accidents in mind; while both these prodigious polymaths are to
some degree unclassifiable, Shavell has made major contributions to the field
of torts (and Kaplow to that quintessential liability rule regime, tax). Finally,
it is perhaps entirely to be expected that property scholars like myself, or like
James Krier,94 would come chugging along to defend property rules from this
onslaught of liability rule expertise.
What is more a subject of bemusement is the next question: Why do these
liability rule experts seem to find the examples from property so much more
vivid, lively, and interesting than the shadow examples from torts, contracts,
and perhaps tax? Property scholars would be tempted to say that the reason is
obvious: Property, we think, is more vivid, lively, and compelling than torts,
contracts, or tax.
Putting such chauvinism to one side, however, it is important to ask
whether all these blithely expansive uses of property examples represent
anything more than a forgivable vanity. The answer, unfortunately, is yes. By
using examples that implicitly claim too much, liability rule scholars lose an
important opportunity to consider that there could be genuine differences
among the historic domains of tort, contract, and property. Since Calabresi and
Melamed's pioneering work, it is not a great stretch to opine that the
dominating issues of tort may be the externalities that accompany Type I
transaction costs, which arise where large numbers of persons or vaguely
specified rights impede actors from bargaining with one another directly.
Perhaps more unexpectedly, it could be that in the areas of the law usually
classed as contract, the dominating issues are to force the information that
overcomes the Type II transaction costs, which arise where bargaining parties
can locate each other and identify their respective rights, but where their deals
may nevertheless falter because of strategic bargaining and "adverse selection."
Finally, it could be that the dominating concerns of what we designate as
94. See generally Krier & Schwab, supra note 2.
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property law are rather different: to create the conditions that induce people to
work hard and to invest in things.
Notice, however, that if there are such differing dominating concerns in the
traditional domains of tort, contract, and property, then property lies in a
certain tension with both tort and contract. Consider, first, the fairly obvious
tension between property and tort. Whereas the tort impulse is to overcome the
externalities attendant on large numbers and indistinct rights by assessing
liability to the actors after the fact of damage, the property impulse is quite
different: It is to redefine and sharpen rights, so that actors can bargain for
themselves and control their own investments. Kaplow and Shavell have
opened our eyes to some of the special costs that a decisionmaker has in
defining property rights and to the relative administrative cost advantages of
using liability approaches instead. Yet their analysis loses sight of some real
advantages of the property approach in actual environmental common pool
scenarios, where the actors' damage-causing actions are interrelated, and where
the liability approach would undermine the actors' abilities to trade and plan
in containing their joint damage to pollution victims. Indeed, James Krier and
Stewart Schwab have identified perhaps the most important reason why the
administrative cost advantages of tort may be incompatible with the bargaining
advantages of property: When decisionmakers, seeing transactions costs, jump
too quickly to solve externalities problems by assessing liability, they may
prevent the parties from even learning to bargain for themselves.95 Of course,
a first step in that bargaining process is learning how to define rights and then
redefine them, shaping entitlements to meet the exigencies of the resource uses
at hand.96
Next, consider the somewhat more surprising tension between contract and
property. Contract and property are often considered to be part of the same
package of "cultural software," 97 the inseparable and indispensable
foundations of a private market order.98 In part this is because the definition
of property rights overcomes Type I transaction costs, and allows parties to
locate each other and reach their own contractual arrangements through
bargaining, rather than either resorting to force or falling back on more socially
or politically determined remedies-including, of course, liability judgments.
95. See id. at 462-64.
96. Rights-definition is a part of property law, and property law often rewards those who make their
claims clear. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. RBv. 73, 81-82
(1985). For the ongoing process of redefining property rights to meet resource use needs, see GARY D.
LmECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 4-9 (1989), which describes efforts to refine or alter
property rights as "contracting for property rights" and then describes some impediments to these efforts.
97. See J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Cultural Sofnvare, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221, 1225 (1995)
(describing cultural software as "the associations, heuristics, metaphors, and capacities that we employ In
the process of understanding and evaluation").
98. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HoFSTRA
L. REV. 711, 749-50 (1980) (referring to private property/free contract (PPFC) as unified "property and
contract regime").
2198 [Vol. 106: 2175
1997]
But if the definition of property rights can obviate Type I transaction costs,
and in that sense permit bargaining and contracting to begin, Ayres and Talley
have shown how property definitions also can introduce Type II transaction
costs. As these authors point out, property rules may allow parties to conceal
private information, and to bargain so strategically that they miss beneficial
trades.
Hence one tension between property and contract concerns the stages of
the bargaining process: Sharply defined property rights may allow the process
of contracting to begin, but those very rights may also impede the further
course of contracting. Once inside the bargaining process, as Ayres and Talley
point out, the parties may again need the liability rules characteristic of
contract law to smoke out private information and thus smooth the further
course of dealing.
There is a second tension between property and contract as well, and it is
one that is strongly suggested by Ayres, both in his work with Talley and more
recently with Balkin. Ayres has identified this tension in somewhat technical
terms as a tradeoff between "adverse selection" and "moral hazard."" In
using these terms, Ayres roughly identifies adverse selection with the
withholding of private information and the strategic bargaining that follows,
while he roughly identifies moral hazard with a failure to plan, invest, and
manage resources carefully.' °° Ayres's remarks suggest that these two types
of problems cannot be solved simultaneously: The liability rules that force the
disclosure of private information may unfortunately come at the cost of careful
management and investment in resources, because liability rules preclude the
investor's capture of her investment;' °  conversely, the property rules that
encourage investment unfortunately come at the cost of permitting the investor
to withhold her private information.
What Ayres and his coauthors have not done is to take the next step: to
note that this tension may mark a systematic contrast between the domains that
we have historically called contract (where adverse selection-i.e., information-
forcing-matters most) and property (where moral hazard-i.e., incentives for
investment-matters most). If Ayres is right that we cannot solve one problem
without exacerbating the other, then we might expect to see contractual labels
99. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 4, at 1085 ("Attempts to remedy adver selection oflten exacerbate
moral hazard .... Thus, policymakers often face a trade-off in choosing legal rules to constrain the tm in
evils."); see also Ayres & Balkin, supra note 4. at 714 (refering to tradeoff bet~ccn moral hazard or
underinvestment and "asymmetric information").
100. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 4. at 1084-85. Ayres and Talley's article specifically refers to
moral hazard as "the inability to control individual behavior contractually." but the examples are of
underinvestment and overuse. Id. at 1085.
101. See Ayres & Balkin. supra note 4. at 714. The simple fact of having to disclose information
might in itself discourage investment, particularly the investment entailed in planning, since those plans
might give the other party ideas; thus planning is a version of what Anthony Kronman calls **delibcrately
acquired information." Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake. Disclosure. Information. and the Lai of Contracts.
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1978).
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invade property law when information-sharing matters more than
investment°2 -- and property labels invade contract law where investment and
effort matter most.
10 3
Although Ayres and his coauthors have highlighted this extremely
interesting tension, their choices of examples obscure the ways that the
common law categories may reflect the very dominating concerns that pull the
different sides of this tension. Ayres and Talley focus largely on the ways that
liability rules can mitigate strategic bargaining, without a comparable
discussion of the countervailing considerations of moral hazard. Authors are
always free to choose their own subjects, of course, but by using property
illustrations for their arguments about strategic bargaining, Ayres and Talley
unfortunately imply that strategic bargaining is of paramount concern in
property too. In fact, the conventional divisions of the common law may be
considerably subtler, effectively designating as "property" those areas where
planning and investment-"moral hazard"--present the more serious issues.
All this comes back to Boomer and to the use of property examples to
illustrate points that really come from concerns dominating torts or contracts.
Overreaching examples blur our vision of the distinctions and tensions among
the historic domains of the common law. That is why the choice of examples,
like much else in rhetoric, really does matter, and why it is important not to
claim too much by showcasing examples that do not quite fit. In doing so, we
may bypass the chance to delve more deeply into our most basic legal
traditions.
The pattern of rhetorical blurring has been a feature of the property
rules/liability rules distinction from the start. No doubt it is a mark of
Calabresi and Melamed's great intellectual force that some of their most
provocative and interesting successors continue their pattern of using shadow
examples. But it is high time to move out of those shadows, and to pay close
attention to examples, so that we can rethink the ways that the astonishingly
supple concepts of the common law may already embed the compellingly
modern insights of The Cathedral.
102. See, e.g., JAMEs E. KRIER & JESSE DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY 522 (3d ed. 1993) (describing old
doctrines presuming effective contract warranty on short-term rentals of furnished rooms, unlike standard
no-warranty rule then current in general landlord-tenant law).
103. See Kronman, supra note 101, at 13-15 (describing pattern in which contract law encourages
production of information by according property rights for "deliberately acquired information" that need
not be disclosed to other party).
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